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CASE SUMMARY 
NONCONSENSUAL WAIVER OF A 
JURY TRIAL: CLOSING THE DOOR, 
BUT NOT COMPLETELY 
UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT 
INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. United States District Court, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the circumstances of a child sexual abuse case did not warrant 
an exception to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
which requires the government's consent for a defendant to waive a jury 
trial.) The court determined that the district court's ruling, which 
allowed the defendant to waive a jury trial without the government's 
consent, was clearly erroneous as a matter of law, and granted the 
government's petition for a writ of mandamus to require the district court 
to hold a jury trial. 2 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On August 19, 2003, the United States charged Allen Harrod, his 
wife, and another married couple with multiple counts arising from the 
transport of young children in interstate commerce with the purpose of 
I United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
2 [d. at 1072. 
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engaging them in illegal sexual acts.3 The victims, defendants' own five 
children, allegedly suffered ritualistic sexual abuse for approximately ten 
years, including "oral copulation, vaginal and anal intercourse, and other 
acts committed upon the children, and acts that the children were forced 
to commit.,,4 Some of the children were as young as age seven when 
abused. 5 Defense counsel indicated that they would not contest either 
that the sexual acts had occurred or that the children were transported 
between states.6 The defense planned to focus instead on lack of intent.7 
On April 14, 2006, eleven days prior to the date set for trial, Harrod 
filed a "'Motion to Waive Jury and to be Tried by Judge. ",8 The basis of 
the motion was that due to the horrific nature of the molestation 
evidence, "no jury could fairly consider defendants' argument that the 
government could not prove knowledge and intent at the time the 
children were transported in interstate commerce.,,9 The government 
opposed the motion. to 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
California held a hearing on defendants' motion for a bench trial on April 
19, 2006. 11 Over the government's objections, the district court granted 
the motion. 12 The court noted that according to defendants' counsel, the 
only defense with any chance of success would be one based on lack of 
knowledge or intent, and stated that it would be "'very difficult for the 
court to control the evidence in such a way that the jury is going to be 
able to focus upon that defense. ", 13 The court further stated that it could 
'" gi ve both sides a fair trial, if [it was] a court trial, ", but said that the 
bottom line was that the court '" [did] not know [whether it could] rule 
correctly on everyone of the evidentiary objections that might be 
deemed to deny defendants a fair trial if [there was] a jury [trial].",14 
2006). 




7 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 
8 1d. 
9 !d. 
10 !d. The government's opposition was predicated on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
23(a), which requires the consent of the government for a defendant to waive a jury trial. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 23(a). See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
II United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
12 1d. 
13 1d. (quoting the district court). 
14 1d. at 1068 (quoting the district court). 
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The district court cited Singer v. United States and asserted "'the 
likelihood that the defendants would not receive a fair trial to a jury 
outweighs any interest that the Government has under Rule 23 to a trial 
by jury.",15 Following its grant of defendants' motion, the district court 
stayed the case to allow the government to file its mandamus petition. 16 
II. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
began by articulating its five-factor test to determine whether to grant 
"the exceptional remedy of mandamus relief' and stated that "[a] 
petitioner need not establish all five ... factors.,,17 One of the factors the 
Ninth Circuit evaluates in its determination is "'whether the district 
court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. ",18 
The Ninth Circuit then reviewed the history of Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 23(a) ("Rule 23(a)") and the United States Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. Singer, which addressed the 
constitutionality of that rule. 19 Rule 23(a) was adopted in 1944 to codify 
the Supreme Court's 1930 holding in Patton v. United States.20 Rule 
23(a) requires the consent of the government and the approval of the 
court in order for a defendant to waive a jury trial in a federal case.21 In 
Singer, the Court held that conditioning a defendant's waiver on the 
consent of the government did not violate the defendant's due process 
and fair trial rights.22 
15 1d. (quoting the district court); see Singer v. United States 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
16 1d. 
17 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 
2006) (citing United States v. Fei Ye,436 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
ISld. at 1069 (quoting Fei Ye, 436 F.3d at 1121-22). The complete five-factor test is as 
follows: 
(1) whether the petitioner has no other adequate means to attain the relief he or she desires; 
(2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on 
appeal; (3) whether the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) 
whether the district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard 
of the federal rules; and (5) whether the district court's order raises new and important 
problems, or issues of law of first impression. 
Id. (quoting Fei Ye, 436 F.3d at 1121-22). 
19 See id. at 1069-70; see also Singer v. United States 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
20 ld. at 1069. The text of Rule 23(a) reads as follows: "Jury Trial. If the defendant is 
entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless: (I) the defendant waives a jury trial in 
writing; (2) the government consents; and (3) the court approves." Id. 
21 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). 
22 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 
2006) (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965)). 
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The Ninth Circuit noted that the Singer Court had remarked it 
"'need not determine ... whether there might be some circumstances 
where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are 
so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would 
result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial. ",23 The Ninth 
Circuit then examined case law after Singer and pointed out that the 
Supreme Court had never determined the circumstances alluded to in 
Singer to exist; to the contrary, the Court had on at least one occasion 
"characterized the requirement of government consent as absolute.,,24 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that lower federal courts had 
generally assumed that Singer provides for a possible exception to the 
government consent requirement. However, the court noted that the two 
district court cases cited by the defendant that granted a waiver over the 
government's objection were from the 1970's, and observed that no 
circuit court that had considered the question had approved such a 
nonconsensual waiver. 25 The court also pointed to the Ninth Circuit case 
of United States v. Reyes, where it had stated that any "'passion, 
prejudice . . . and public feeling'" defendant feared from the jury was 
addressed during the voir dire proceedings, and upheld the trial court's 
refusal to grant defendant's nonconsensual waiver.26 
Moving on to the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that "'a mistake ha[d] been committed. ",27 The court found 
that "the district court, as a matter of law, was clearly erroneous in 
ordering a non-jury trial without the consent of the prosecution.,,28 The 
court noted that "while trying this case [wa]s not without its challenges," 
the court was confident that the trial judge was "fully capable of ensuring 
the[] defendants an impartial trial. ,,29 The court observed that the trial 
court had an abundance of tools at its disposal, derived from the Federal 
Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure and the court's inherent 
23 ld. (quoting Singer, 380 U.S. at 37). 
24 ld. (citing Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979)). 
25 ld. at 1070-71 (citations omitted). 
26 ld. at 1071 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 8 F.3d 1379, 1390 (9th Cir. 1993)). One 
commentator has suggested that any possibility of a Singer exception based on fear of an impartial 
jury trial is illusory: "[Sjince a defendant has an absolute right to a trial by an impartial jury, any 
defendant who makes such a demonstration is entitled to a dismissal, thereby rendering any right to a 
bench trial grounded in the fair trial guarantee superfluous." Jon Fieldman, Comment, Singer v. 
United States and the Misapprehended Source of the Nonconsensual Bench Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 
222,223 (1984). 
27 United States v. U.S. Dis!. Court for the E. Dis!. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 
2006) (quoting United States v. Fei Ye, 436 F.3d 1117. 1123 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
28 ld. at 1072. 
29 ld. at 1071. 
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power, to ensure an impartial trial.3o 
The Ninth Circuit then returned to its discussion of the five-factor 
mandamus test, and found that in addition to the clearly erroneous factor, 
two other factors were met: the government had no other adequate means 
to force the district court to hold a jury trial, and this error was not 
correctable on appeal.31 The court also mentioned that the issue of 
government consent "raise[d] an important question of law," thereby 
satisfying an additional mandamus factor.32 The court accordingly 
granted the government's petition for a writ of mandamus, and directed 
the district court to rescind its order granting defendant's jury trial 
waiver motion. 33 
m. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in this case affirms the jurisprudence 
of other circuit courts.34 This will likely make it harder for defendants in 
federal criminal trials to obtain a nonconsensual jury trial waiver, 
particularly in the Ninth Circuit. The underlying case here involved 
particularly heinous crimes, committed against children.35 It is difficult 
to imagine a case with more potential for jury '''passion, prejudice[, or] 
public feeling",36 to render an impartial jury trial impossible; this raises 
the bar for defendants attempting to show impartiality such that a 
nonconsensual waiver is warranted.37 
The Ninth Circuit appears to have left the door open, however. In 
commenting on the Singer Court's observation that it did not need to 
determine in that case whether a nonconsensual waiver might under 
some circumstances be warranted, the Ninth Circuit stated that, "Neither 
need we make such a determination. ,,38 This statement might keep hope 
30 1d. The court listed several examples of such tools, including voir dire, limitations of 
cumulative and "bad acts" evidence, and jury instructions emphasizing that each and every element 
of the charged offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1071-72. 
3 J Id. at 1072. 
32 United States v. U.S. Dis!. Court for the E. Dis!. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
33 /d. 
34 See id. at 1070-71 (citing decisions of other circuit courts and noting that those circuit 
courts that had considered the issue had "uniformly upheld trial courts' refusals to grant such 
waivers without government consent.") (citations omitted). 
35 1d. at 1067. 
36 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37-38 (1965) (quoting petitioner's briefat 24). 
37 One commentator asserts that such an exception for impartiality would be superfluous. 
See Fieldman, supra note 26, at 223. 
38 United States v. U.S. Dis!. Court for the E. Dis!. of Cal., 464 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
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alive for defendants, wishing to obtain a nonconsensual bench trial, that 
their circumstances could merit a Singer exception. 
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